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Mexico’s Economic Reforms Propel Postrecession Rebound
A Conversation with Banco de México’s Governor Agustín Carstens
Dr. Carstens has led Mexico’s central bank since January 2010, after serving as the 
government’s secretary of finance and as deputy managing director for the International 
Monetary Fund. He holds a PhD in economics from the University of Chicago and received his 
undergraduate degree from Mexico’s Autonomous Institute of Technology. Carstens recently 
visited the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas and met with a group of the Bank’s economists.
Q. What is the outlook for 2011 growth, and 
what are Banco de México’s biggest challenges 
ahead?
A.  Since  2010,  Mexico  has  experienced  a 
very strong recovery. Inflation went from 3.5 
percent in 2009 to 4.4 percent in 2010, and 
the increase included the impact of a higher 
value-added tax. Right now, inflation is back 
at 3.7 percent. The economy grew very fast 
in 2010, and it is very likely that it will grow 
soundly in 2011. 
We have been operating under an infla-
tion targeting scheme since 2001 and have 
been perfecting it over the years. Banco de 
México has a permanent inflation target of 
3  percent  and  has  established  a  tolerance 
bound or interval of plus or minus 1 percent. 
Basically, our policy instrument is the equiva-
lent of the Fed’s federal funds rate. 
Core inflation [excluding food and ener-
gy] has behaved very well. We expect it to be   
3 percent at the end of 2011. Noncore infla-
tion is very volatile because it is composed of 
agricultural prices and government-regulated 
prices, which in Mexico are important. The 
price of gasoline, for example, is regulated 
by the government—sometimes with lags and 
sometimes with leads relative to its interna-
tional reference prices. For the last few years, 
it has been subject to a very rapid rate of ad-
justment of more than 10 percent per year.
From the point of view of monetary pol-
icy management, the main challenge we face 
is how to deal with noncore inflation: how 
much of it we can tolerate and how much 
we need to fight. There is always the consid-
eration that as noncore inflation feeds into 
core inflation and inflation expectations, the 
central bank needs to do something about it. 
Right now, the main challenge we face is the 
current sharp increase in commodity prices: 
Is it a one-time relative price change, or is 
it something that has a dynamic component 
that will feed into core inflation? 
Another very important dilemma that we 
face is the influence of U.S. monetary policy 
on Mexico’s monetary policy and how much 
our stance needs to be judged independent-
ly of or in relative proportion to the U.S. In 
practice, as U.S. monetary policy has become 
more lax, Mexico’s monetary policy has be-
come tighter, without us adjusting the refer-
ence rate. This has attracted capital inflows. 
Thus, the appreciation of the peso versus the 
dollar has been an important factor in keeping 
core inflation low.
This certainly implies that when the U.S. 
starts unwinding its monetary policy stance, 
our exchange rate will probably be affected 
in some way. At that point, we might have to 
make other types of decisions. The two deci-
sions we have to make now are how to react 
to  commodity  price  increases  and  how  we 
should adjust or calibrate our monetary pol-
icy in terms of the changes in U.S. monetary 
policy.
Q. How did the Mexican economy handle the 
global financial crisis?
A.  I  remember  when,  as  a  finance  secre-
tary, we prepared the budget for 2009. The   
macro framework we presented in Septem-
ber 2008 was based on an expected GDP 
[gross domestic product] growth of 3 percent 
for 2009. And that was basically the consen-
sus forecast. We were deeply affected when 
the  financial  crisis  erupted,  and  Mexico’s 
GDP  fell  6.1  percent  in  2009.  Trade  col-
lapsed dramatically after the fall of Lehman 
Brothers [in September 2008].
In the midst of this turmoil, when all 
the countries around the world were talking 
about how they were going to expand fiscal 
policy, we looked at the worsening public 
finances and agreed on the need to raise the 
value-added tax. That kept public finances 
under control. Partly as a result, we had a 
very strong rebound in the economy, and 
that is why we expect GDP to grow between 
4.5 and 5 percent in 2011. 
Q. What accounted for Mexico’s resiliency 
following the recession?
A.  Mexico  had  two  lost  decades  in  terms 
of growth and development, mostly due to 
poor macroeconomic management. We had 
major crises in 1976, 1982 and 1987 and then 
a financial crisis in 1994, which cost 18 per-
cent of GDP. All of this led to some impor-
tant institutional changes in banking super-
vision and regulation, in terms of the central 
bank and fiscal policy. 
Our 1994 banking crisis not only made 
us put the banking system back into shape, 
but forced us to take some additional steps. 
What is happening now is that the world 
is  catching  up  with  Mexico.  Since  we  ex-
perienced  the  banking  crisis  before  other 
countries, we were more resilient this time 
around.  Our  banking  system  was  left  un-
scathed by the recent financial crisis. Mexico 
is a country that in the near future can rely 
on the financial sector to support its eco-
nomic growth.
The other important reforms have been 
in  monetary  policy  and  monetary  policy 
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“Since we experienced the banking crisis before other 
countries, we were more resilient this time around. 
Our banking system was left unscathed.”
1993–94 and in 1995. Before that, monetary 
policy making was clearly under fiscal domi-
nance. The central bank was financing the 
public deficit, and that led to very stubborn 
inflation and to an unsustainable fixed-ex-
change-rate  regime.  Obviously,  the  effect 
of high inflation was extremely detrimental 
to the Mexican economy and society. Fol-
lowing the reforms, we moved to a floating 
exchange rate regime and the central bank 
gained its autonomy. Today, Banco de Méxi-
co has one of the strongest autonomy man-
dates in the world.
We also have a single monetary policy 
mandate: the pursuit of price stability.
Compared to other countries, we do not 
have a mandate of pursuing growth, which I 
would say, for the most part, is a relief. Our 
mandate also states that, at the constitutional 
level,  no  authority  can  dictate  the  central 
bank’s credit policy. It specifies very clearly 
that we cannot grant any financing to the 
government. This was a major breakthrough.
The last institutional development has 
involved fiscal discipline. Before our credit 
crisis in 1994, there was a lot of creative ac-
counting and very blurry records of public 
finances  with  periodic  “surprises.”  Things 
have cleared up as time has passed. Now, 
Mexico is completely transparent in its fiscal 
accounts and, I would say, has developed a 
very deeply ingrained responsibility in both 
the federal government and, over the years, 
in Congress. This has been institutionalized, 
as it is now set by law. Unless there is an im-
portant underlying reason, the budget needs 
to  be  balanced.  There  are  some  excep-
tions—in case of a natural disaster or anoth-
er clear reason to deviate. In those circum-
stances, the government has to explain to 
Congress why it is necessary to deviate from 
the balanced-budget goal and also present a 
plan to bring the budget back into balance.
Q. What was the significance of adopting a 
floating exchange rate?
A.  In  the  early  1990s,  there  was  a  major 
problem with policy coordination in a way 
similar to what Europe is currently experi-
encing.  When  you  have  a  fixed  exchange 
rate, you need to have sufficient policy co-
ordination in order to make 
the  rest  of  the  macroeco-
nomic  framework  consis-
tent with the exchange rate. 
At that time, Mexico had a 
relatively  lax  fiscal  policy. 
We  also  had  problems  in 
the banking sector, and sig-
nificant  capital  inflows.  At 
some point, it became obvi-
ous that the exchange rate 
was not consistent with the 
macroeconomic  framework.  We  began  to 
experience speculative attacks on the peso. 
All hell broke loose. We had a combination 
of a balance-of-payments and banking crisis. 
At that point, we made a very important de-
cision: We got rid of the fixed exchange rate.
Mexico operated under a sort of fixed 
exchange  rate  for  decades.  In  the  early 
1990s, not only Mexico but many emerging 
countries  were  under  the  veil  of  an  eco-
nomics doctrine, which established that in 
a small, open economy, a floating exchange 
rate would never work because it would be 
extremely volatile and lead to poor econom-
ic performance.
Since then, many countries have gradu-
ally shifted from fixed to floating exchange 
rate regimes. I believe these measures have 
been  extremely  useful.  Moving  to  flexible 
rate regimes has really made emerging mar-
kets far more resilient. In Mexico, the com-
bination of a flexible exchange rate regime 
with a strong mandate for the monetary au-
thority has transformed the monetary policy 
framework established by the central bank 
into a really solid anchor. This framework 
certainly proved to have worked well during 
the most recent global financial crisis. 
Q. Mexican banks held up well during the global 
financial crisis. What accounts for their superior 
performance? Are there changes planned to 
comply with Basel III, the international bank 
regulatory update approved last year?
A. After our crisis in 1994, a major boost was 
given not only to upgrade our supervisory 
capacity and our regulatory instruments but, 
to some extent, to be ahead of the curve. As 
a matter of fact, many of the standards that 
are now being addressed and created as part 
of Basel III are in the process of being imple-
mented in Mexico. 
Mexico will implement Basel III in the 
coming months. Why? Well, because, basi-
cally,  we  are  already  there.  For  example, 
a major advance in Basel III is how much 
core capital [equity and cash reserve fund-
ing] must comprise basic capital. There were 
many aspects of the capital definition that 
were weak before—for instance, the provi-
sions for deferred taxes. Liquidity provisions, 
we have already taken care of. 
The Mexican banking system was very 
resilient to the recent real shock to the econ-
omy. Banks continue to be profitable. They 
have only reduced the rate of credit grant-
ing as a precautionary measure, in response 
to how their operations were unfolding in 
the rest of the world. To counteract tighten-
ing credit—and this was the only important 
countercyclical  measure  implemented—au-
thorities  used  the  development  bank  net-
work to assume part of the credit risk from 
certain  transactions  and  induce  banks  to 
take more risk. These actions turned out very 
well. Moreover, the program has not cost the 
Mexican government a cent because there 
was no intrinsic risk in those transactions. 